Massachusetts Court Rejects Chapter 93A Claim


In CRA International, Inc. v. duPont Registry Group, the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts addressed, among other issues, whether a plaintiff can transform a straightforward nonpayment dispute into a viable claim under Chapter 93A. CRA alleged that duPont Registry Group (DRG) violated Chapter 93A by willfully refusing to pay nearly $1 million in invoices for consulting services. The court’s April 6, 2026, analysis underscores the high bar required for converting a breach of contract action into an unfair or deceptive act or practice. Chapter 93A liability requires more than mere nonpayment or even a knowing breach of contract. Instead, the plaintiff must allege facts showing that the defendant engaged in conduct with a “coercive quality” or used the breach as leverage to obtain an unwarranted, unbargained-for benefit.

Applying that standard, the court held that CRA’s allegations were insufficient. The complaint relied on conclusory assertions that DRG’s alleged failure to pay was “intentional and willful,” but it did not include any factual details suggesting extortionate conduct, bad-faith leverage, or other aggravating circumstances beyond a payment dispute. Courts have consistently rejected such attempts to “bootstrap” Chapter 93A claims onto ordinary contract disputes, and this case follows that line of authority, emphasizing that even a deliberate refusal to pay likely does not cross the statutory threshold.

The court also rejected CRA’s effort to supplement its pleading through arguments in its opposition brief, including references to alleged “promises to pay” characterized as a “ruse,” because the plaintiff did not plead those assertions in the complaint. The court’s ruling reinforces that plaintiffs must plead specific, non-conclusory facts demonstrating unfair or deceptive conduct at the outset of the case and that later advocacy to cure deficiencies may be insufficient. Where a complaint alleges nothing more than nonpayment under a contract, a targeted Rule 12(b)(6) motion may help eliminate Chapter 93A exposure at the pleading stage.



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